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Abstract
This paper examines the contribution of job matching to wage growth in the
U.S. and Germany using data drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
and the German Socio-Economic Panel from 1984 through 1992. Using a sym-
metrical set of variables and data handling procedures, real wage growth is found
to be higher in the U.S. than in Germany during this period. Also, using two dif-
ferent estimators, job matches are found to enhance wage growth in the U.S. and
retard it in Germany. The relationship of general skills to employment in each
country appears responsible for this result.
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 National policies for workforce education and training are designed to increase 
the human capital of workers and provide a labor pool well suited to the needs of 
industry.  Increased productivity due to improved skills as well as better matches between 
workers and employers should lead to greater individual compensation and increased 
national prosperity.  This paper provides an empirical examination of the contribution of 
job matching to rates of wage growth in two countries that pursue different national 
policies for workforce education and training, Germany and the United States1 
 The choice of these two countries for the analysis allows a contrast between 
relatively centralized and decentralized approaches to workforce education and training.  
The differences in their respective systems are well known and extensively documented 
(Abraham and Houseman 1993).  The majority of German workers are educated, trained, 
and certified for employment in a specific industry.  The number of educational 
opportunities are planned, controlled through competitive examination, and financed by 
the government.  The majority of American workers pursue a general education.  Post-
secondary education is often self-financed, and demand from students plays a large role 
in the opportunities available.  Relative to the United States, the German system is both 
more centralized and specific in nature. 
 Which system is preferable from a perspective of either overall wage growth or 
improved job matching is debatable.  It has been argued that a relatively centralized 
system offers a number of advantages.  When the average worker leaves school, they do 
not face as difficult a transition to work since they are certified for employment.  Since 
workers have both classroom education and direct experience, they will be more 
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productive.  As the government actively plans the number of school leavers with specific 
certifications, better matches between workers and firms can be achieved. 
 Each of these possible advantages, however, can be argued to constitute a 
potential disadvantage.  A system that requires individuals to make occupational 
decisions early in life may result in poor choices due to inexperience.  At times of 
structural shifts in employment or worker dislocation, specific industrial education may 
be a disadvantage for worker mobility.  Moreover, government planning may lack the 
flexibility needed to adapt to changing market conditions. 
 While there are many possible impacts of a national system of education and 
training, this paper specifically examines the impact of job matches on rates of wage 
growth in the two countries.  Real wage growth is consistently found to be higher in the 
United States than in Germany, and using two different estimation techniques, job 
matches are found to enhance wage growth in the U.S. while retarding it in Germany. 
 The paper will proceed with a review of the literature regarding the determinants 
of wage growth and the role of job matching in that context.  A brief discussion of some 
of the institutional differences in the educational and training systems of Germany and 
the United States will also be provided.  Then, initial evidence will be presented on 
overall returns to skills and wage growth in the U.S. and Germany in order to provide a 
context for considering the role of job matching.  The contribution of job matching to 
wage growth will first be considered through an individual fixed effects model.  The final 
section of the paper will provide an additional analysis of the portion of wage growth 
attributable in the two countries to job matching following the approach developed by 
Topel (1991). 
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I.  Literature Review 
 Determinants of workers’ wages are fundamental to understanding labor market 
activity.  An extensive theoretical literature provides competing explanations for 
observed patterns in wage rates, and an active empirical literature has confronted those 
theories with evidence.  The vast majority of this research has focused on individual labor 
markets.   
 A common empirical pattern reported from the earliest research is the presence of 
a positive association of both experience and tenure with earnings (Mincer 1962).2  Three 
major theories provide explanations for these basic empirical observations; human 
capital, job-matching, and efficiency wage.   
 According to human capital theory, workers are paid according to the value 
marginal product of general and specific labor market skills (Becker 1962 and Mincer 
1962).  General skills are transportable to other employers and specific skills are not.  
Since general skills are portable, firms should not pay for their financing.  Jobs providing 
general skills should have lower starting wages and a positively sloped experience-
earnings profile.  Specific skills are not transportable and might be financed by the firm 
or the individual.  If financed by the firm, one would expect the employer to pay enough 
to the employee to discourage movement so that the investment can be recouped.  If 
financed by the employee, a job would be characterized by lower starting pay and a 
relatively more steeply sloped wage profile than in the case of firm financing or absence 
of training.  Intermediate cases of shared investment are also possible (Hashimoto 1981; 
Hashimoto 2001; and Leuven and Oosterbeek 2001).   
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 In matching models, individuals receive job offers during their lifetimes, 
successively accepting offers which provide a better fit between them and attributes of 
the firm (Burdett 1978; Jovanovic 1979; and Flinn 1986).  As both greater experience and 
tenure are indicative of the quality of employment matches, both are expected to be 
positively related to wages.  Thus, these models generate positively sloped wage profiles 
which are independent of worker skills.  
 In efficiency wage models, worker productivity is influenced by pay (Lazear 
1981).  Young workers are paid less and older workers more than their value marginal 
product.  This scheme induces young workers to put forth effort in order to stay with a 
firm until they can be overpaid as an older worker.  For older workers, the incentive is to 
work hard in order to continue being paid more than their value.  In the model, wages 
grow independent of skill 
 A substantial empirical literature has sought to distinguish which factors from 
among these theories best explain patterns observed in returns to years of employment.  
Human capital theory indicates that training on the job, whether worker or firm financed, 
and whether general or specific, should result in upward sloping wage profiles.  To 
estimate the relative contributions of general and specific skills in the theory, empirical 
researchers have typically focused on years of total work experience as a proxy for time 
spent gaining general labor market skills.  Similarly, the duration of employment with a 
single employer, tenure, is used as a proxy for time potentially spent acquiring specific 
labor market skills.  From the earliest work (Mincer 1962), the basic empirical pattern of 
a positive association of experience and tenure to wages has been universally reported. 
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 The empirical observation that years of experience and tenure are each positively 
related to earnings is consistent with human capital theory but does not rule out other 
explanations.  Job matching theories also predict upward sloping tenure-wage profiles, 
and a body of empirical work has examined the extent to which matching is responsible 
for this observation.   
 The problem encountered in estimation is that observed years of experience and 
tenure are related to the quality of a job match.  So, estimation methods that do not take 
this issue into account provide biased estimates of returns to skills.   Some of that 
research takes an econometric approach to isolating the effect of job matching relative to 
tenure (Flinn 1986; Altonji and Shakotko 1987; and Topel 1991).  Based on those 
articles, one would reasonably conclude that job matching plays some role in generating 
observed returns to skills although estimates of the exact contribution vary.   
 In order to move away from econometric restrictions in attempts to identify the 
effect of matching on returns to tenure, a more recent literature has exploited longitudinal 
data from job displacements (Kletzer 1989; Ruhm 1991; and Neal 1995).  The argument 
behind these papers is that permanent job loss is an exogenous event uncontrolled by 
individual workers.  Comparing earnings before and after the event of an exogenously 
imposed job loss should reveal the extent to which returns to tenure are associated with 
factors related to that specific job match.  Each of these papers (Kletzer 1989; Ruhm 
1991; and Neal 1995) reports evidence that that a portion of returns to skills are due to 
the quality of job matches.3   
   Efficiency wage theories also generate positively sloped wage profiles.  One 
testable implication of the theory is that these profiles should be more flatly sloped in 
 7 
segments of the labor market where agency problems are not as large (Lazear and Moore 
1986).  Also, since earnings will increase in the absence of productivity gains, returns to 
tenure will occur in firms with no training.  Levine (1993) finds that firms that provided 
more training did not exhibit larger returns to tenure.  Other researchers have investigated 
whether pay is linked with firm measures of worker productivity such as job evaluations 
and have found that the link is weak (Medoff and Abraham 1980 and 1981).  Thus, there 
is also empirical support for the view that firms use considerations beyond productivity in 
their wage setting process. 
 The most recent research in this area has used information on both firms and their 
workers to investigate alternative theories of wage determination in a more integrated 
framework (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999 and Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis, and 
Troske 2001).  Their research demonstrates that all of the previously theorized influences 
do play a role in wage determination.  Based on their results, it would also appear that 
individual effects are more important than firm effects in explaining the variation in wage 
rates. 
 In summary, these theoretical and empirical literatures have advanced together in 
attempting to explain which factors in the labor market lead to positively sloped earnings 
profiles.  At this point, most would agree that the market rewards general and specific 
skills and that observed returns additionally reflect both the quality of the job match as 
well as attempts of firms to raise productivity through the structure of compensation. 
 As our understanding of wage determinants has solidified, a literature which 
makes comparisons across countries has begun to develop.  The goal of these papers is to 
see how similar the factors are which determine wages in different countries and how 
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institutions may affect their importance in different societies  (Abowd, Kramarz, 
Margolis, and Troske 2001, Hashimoto and Raisian 1985 and Levine 1993).  Each of 
these international comparisons has been limited to some extent in the topics that could 
be examined due to the need to have comparable data across countries for the analysis. 
 The work of Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) was motivated by the superior 
economic performance of Japan relative to the United States in the 1970s and 1980s and 
the observation that the Japanese labor market appeared to be characterized by longer 
attachments between firms and employees.  Using nationally representative data, they 
found that returns to additional years of employment are higher and peak later in Japan 
than in the U.S.  From this, they concluded that Japanese workers had a stronger 
incentive to remain with one employer, and this was reflected in lower rates of turnover 
and higher years of tenure in the Japanese labor market. 
 Levine (1993) used samples of matched firms and workers in Japan and the 
United States to critically examine whether human capital theory was consistent with the 
positively sloped employment-earnings profiles in the two countries.  Focusing primarily 
on whether firms that provide more training have steeper tenure-wage profiles and 
whether firms with higher returns to tenure have lower turnover, Levine presented 
evidence against both of these hypotheses.  He concludes that human capital theory is not 
consistent with the evidence presented and suggests that efficiency wage theory provides 
a better explanation of wage setting in the two countries.   
 Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis, and Troske (2001) compare the U.S. and France 
using matched individual and firm level data.  They examine the impact of firm and 
individual characteristics on wage determination and other outcomes.  They find that 
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standard human capital variables earn positive returns in the labor market and that 
unobserved individual and firm attributes impact wages.  Another particularly interesting 
finding of their study is that higher wages are related to greater productivity in both U.S. 
and French firms.   
 This paper similarly provides a comparative examination of wage rate 
determination.  The primary focus of the research is to obtain evidence regarding the 
contribution of job matching to wage growth in the United States and Germany.   
II.  Institutional Differences 
 A detailed examination of all of the institutional differences between Germany 
and the United States that impact on this analysis would be out of place in a paper that 
seeks to examine an outcome associated with a broad approach rather than a specific 
aspect of policy.  Nonetheless, some brief information which characterizes the major 
differences will be presented here.  An excellent, detailed comparison of educational and 
labor market institutions in the two countries can be found in Abraham and Houseman 
(1993). 
 German secondary education has two main tracks, vocational training and college 
preparatory.  Determination of tracking is made by competitive examination.  The 
majority of German secondary students participate in the vocational track which is 
usually referred to as the dual system of education.  The term dual refers to classes 
students take about the industry in which they will work and the practical training they 
simultaneously receive through an apprenticeship at a relevant firm.  Upon completion, 
the Germans are formally certified to work in an industry.  This track of education is 
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taken by more than 80 percent of German secondary students (Couch 1994; Winkelmann 
1996).  
 Little formal certification exists for high school students in the United States.  
Based on student self-assessments, vocational degrees are received by about 30 percent 
of secondary students.  At the secondary level, education in the U.S. is clearly more 
general in its content than in Germany. 
At the post-secondary level, there are other contrasts.  University education is 
government financed in Germany, and there are few opportunities for those who would 
like to self-finance education beyond what their placement scores have merited.  14 
percent of Germans hold a university degree.  In the United States, ability to pay plays a 
much larger role in educational access at the post-secondary level.  A policy of loans and 
grants has arisen to reduce this concern.  Whether through private resources or public 
assistance, more opportunities for risk taking exist when individuals perceive post-
secondary education is a good investment.   As a result, 27 percent of the labor force in 
the United States holds a university degree. 
While one can make a priori arguments that one or another system is superior, the 
German education and job training approach is clearly more centralized than that of the 
U.S.  Here, the intention is to investigate how these broad policy approaches affect wage 
growth and job matches in the two countries.   
II.  Returns to Skills and Wage Growth in Germany and the United States 
 Job matching is theoretically expected to be a component of overall wage growth.  
In standard models, wage growth can be seen through the combined rates of return to 
experience and tenure.  To provide initial estimates of returns to skills for Germany and 
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the United States, panel regressions of log wages on standard explanatory variables are 
estimated using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the United 
States and from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for Germany for the years 
from 1984 through 1992.  Male workers ages 18 to 60 are included in the sample.  
Additional selection criteria are that the worker must be employed 1000 hours in the year 
and must report annual earnings of 1000 Deutsche Marks or the U.S. equivalent.  Self-
employed and government workers are excluded.  This sample is used as the basis of all 
of the analyses presented in the paper.  There are 10,110 observations from the PSID and 
8,281 from the GSOEP.  Unless noted otherwise, estimates presented in the paper are 
weighted to account for the longitudinal nature of the data.   
 For the variables used to decompose the employment experience of a typical 
worker into proxies for their general and specific skills, conventions in the literature 
regarding their measurement are followed.  In both data sets, retrospective information on 
years of full-time employment experience is used to calculate years of total labor market 
experience.  This variable is considered a proxy for general labor market skills.  Also, 
information regarding years of employment with a specific employer is used to calculate 
years of tenure for the workers in each country.  This variable is considered a proxy for 
specific skills.   
 In handling each of the variables used in the analysis, identical selection criteria 
were used both in extracting the observations and in any recoding which was performed.  
Perhaps the one variable which is deserving of some comment is tenure as the noise in 
that variable is well known (Topel 1991).  One initial comment to make is that relative to 
prior studies using the PSID data, the questions asked regarding employment duration 
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stopped using bracketed responses and began referring to actual time spans prior to the 
date at which the sample here is drawn.  While this may have alleviated some problems 
regarding noise in the sample, unrealistic patterns in the tenure information were 
observed.  Thus, some recoding of the data was performed similar to that reported by 
Topel.  The general effect of this cleaning on the data was to increase the estimated 
returns to experience and tenure in both the United States and Germany.  None of the 
qualitative conclusions were altered.  Appendix A1 contains a description of the 
recoding, patterns of tenure in the two countries, and a comparison of the tenure variable 
from the PSID against a published source. 
 Other regressors included in the analysis are marital status, years of schooling, 
and a set of categorical time dummies.  The dependent variable is the natural log of 
average hourly wages calculated as annual labor earnings divided by annual work hours.  
The wages are measured as real 1984 figures.  Unweighted means and standard 
deviations of the pooled sample of observations from each country are reported in table 1.  
Comparable weighted estimates are contained in appendix table 2.4 
 The equation estimated can be written as: 
ijtijtijtijt TXY εββα +++= 21  (1.) 
Y refers to the log of average hourly wages.  The subscript i refers to individuals, j to 
employers, and t to time periods..  X represents years of full-time job experience.  T 
represents years of tenure with an employer.  ε is measurement error.   
 In addition to the means and standard deviations of the variables, table 1 contains 
unweighted parameter estimates from the panel regressions for Germany and the United 
States.  The terms for experience and tenure are represented as quartics.  Based on those 
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estimates, in the U.S., the estimated return to a year of experience is 6.3 percent and for 
an additional year of employment tenure is 4.4 percent.  This yields a combined 10.7 
percent average rate of wage growth over the period examined.   For Germany, the 
returns to both experience and tenure are much lower than in the United States.  Returns 
to years of experience are 3.1 percent and 1.3 percent for a year of tenure yielding a 
combined 4.4 percent annual increase in wages.  By reference to the estimates contained 
in appendix table 2, it can be seen that weighting has a relatively small impact on the 
parameter estimates.  
 In general, the returns to both experience and tenure in Germany and the United 
States have the expected shape.  This can be seen by the alternating signs of the 
parameter estimates associated with the higher order terms for tenure and experience in 
each country.  All of the relevant parameter estimates are statistically significant at the 
.05 level. 
IV. Fixed Effect Estimates 
 In matching theory, individuals search for jobs where their own characteristics 
align with the needs of an employer.  Good outcomes are more durable, and years of 
observed experience and tenure reflect the quality of a job match.  One method of 
investigating the contribution of job matches to wage growth is to model that component 
as an individual fixed effect.   
 The fixed effect estimation equation rewrites the error term to consist of a time 
invariant component related to individuals along with a fixed component for each time 
period.  The equation for individuals can be written as: 
ijttiijtijtijt TXY ζγφββα +++++= 21
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Φi represents the individual fixed effect.  γt represents the fixed time component.   is the 
random error component. 
ξ
 Table 1 contains unweighted results for the fixed effect models estimated for the 
U.S. and Germany.  Because the panel regressions contained in table 1 included dummy 
variables for the years from which the data were drawn and a common set of control 
variables, the impact of the individual fixed effects can be seen by the change in the 
parameter estimates across the two tables.  Interestingly, as individual fixed effects are 
controlled for in the United States, the estimates of both the returns to experience and 
tenure fall.  One interpretation of this result is that gross returns to labor market skills are 
inflated by the average quality of employment matches.  In Germany, the opposite result 
is found.  Relative to the panel regression estimates in table 1, the returns to experience 
and tenure rise when the individual fixed effects are included.  One interpretation is the 
average quality of job matches depresses observed wage growth.  
V.  Residual Correlation Model 
 Examining the possibility that the quality of job matches are reflected in 
individual fixed effects tells us something about the portion of wage growth that might be 
attributed to job matching.  An alternative method of modeling the relationship between 
observed labor market activity and the unobserved quality of a job match was developed 
by Topel (1991).  The method provides estimates of total wage growth as well as the 
component attributable to job matching.  The model of Topel (1991) begins with a 
standard log wage equation (1.) in the form of the one presented earlier in the paper.5  
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 Potential biases exist in obtaining estimates of the returns to general and specific 
skills from least squares estimates of equation (1.) since either may be correlated with the 
error term,  εijt.  This can be made more explicit by rewriting the residual as 
ijtiijtijt υµφε ++=  
µi represents an individual fixed effect.  φ ijt represents factors specific to the match 
between a job and individual.   νijt is random error.  The factors specific to a job match 
may be nonorthogonal to tenure and experience.  Represent this relationship as 
ijtijtijtijt bTbX ηφ ++= 21  
This system of equations together yields the conclusion that least square estimates of  β1 
and  β2 will be consistent but biased; i.e., 
111 )ˆ( bE += ββ  
and 
.  222 )ˆ( bE += ββ
From (1.), a two-step estimation procedure is formed by first estimating a differenced 
earnings equation.  This eliminates fixed job and individual effects.  The equation to be 
estimated is 
 Y  (2.)1211 −− −++=− ijtijtijtijt Y εεββ  
Least squares of (2.) will provide an estimate of total wage growth. 
 The second stage of the estimation procedure removes the portion of growth due 
to years of tenure from observed earnings then estimates the returns to experience at the 
time the job started. 
 Y   (3.)ijtijtijt XT εββ +=− 10ˆ  
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Here,  represents the estimates of parameters associated with wage growth from the 
first step. X
βˆ
0 represents experience at the time the current job started.  By this procedure, 
an estimate of the returns to seniority is obtained as .  When least 
squares is applied to this system of equations, the resulting estimates are consistent but 
biased. 
1212
ˆ)ˆˆ(ˆ ββββ −+=
)()ˆ( 21111 0 bbbE TX +++= γββ  (4a.)  
and  
)()ˆ( 21122 0 bbbE TX ++−= γββ  (4b.) 
 
  Although these estimates are biased, they provide an upper bound on the 
estimated return to general skills and a lower bound on the return to specific skills.  
is the coefficient from an auxiliary regression of tenure on initial experience. An 
empirical estimate of (b
TX 0
γ
1 + b2) can be obtained by reinserting Tijt into the right hand side 
of equation (3.) since  can be rewritten as .  Thus, one can 
also obtain an inference about a portion of the bias in equation (4.),  .  
ijtφ ijtijt bbTbX η+++ )( 2110
γ )( 210 bbTX +
 Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of equation (2.) by least squares.  The 
change in experience variable is omitted because it would be collinear with the change in 
tenure variable.  The parameter associated with ∆Tenure thus estimates  β1 +  β2 ; i.e., the 
overall rate of wage growth.  Across the three columns of the table, various combinations 
of higher order terms are presented to demonstrate the relative stability of the parameter 
 17 
estimate associated with ∆Tenure.  Across all of the estimates, the higher order terms 
take the expected signs.  Statistical significance at the .05 level is denoted in the table. 
 Comparing the results shown here for the United States to those obtained by 
Topel (table 2, p. 157) using PSID data spanning the period from 1968 through 1983, 
they are very similar.  For example, in the quartic specification in column (3.), the 
estimated magnitude of  β1 +  β2 in Topel’s work is .126 which is the same as the value 
reported here in table 3.  While this result is certainly not expected, it does suggest that 
wage growth has not changed appreciably across these two time periods. 
 The estimates for wage growth in Germany based on equation (2.) which are 
shown in table 2 indicate that the combined returns to a year of experience and 
employment tenure are smaller than in the United States.  Table 3 provides the second 
step estimates from equation (3.) of the experience parameter,  β1.  By subtracting  β1 
from  β1 +  β2, an estimate is obtained for  β2.  In order to provide standard errors for  β1 
and  β2 that are reflective of the two stage estimation procedure, the calculation process 
was bootstrapped for 100 iterations, sampling the individuals in the sample with 
replacement.  The standard errors shown in table 3 result from the bootstrapping 
procedure.  Statistical significance at the .05 level is denoted in the table. 
 The parameter estimates for the U.S. are very similar to those reported by Topel 
(table 3, p.158).    He reports the return to experience to be .071 and .055 for the return to 
tenure.  Here, the return to experience is .085 and the return to tenure is .041.  The return 
to experience, .034, is smaller in Germany than for the U.S.  The estimated return to 
tenure in Germany, .064, is larger than in the U.S.  
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 The estimate of the bias term, (b1 + b2),  is obtained by inserting the tenure 
variable on the right hand side of equation (3.) and applying least squares.  The estimates 
are shown in the last column and reflect the impact job matching would be expected to 
have on least squares estimates.  The standard errors reported in the table are also 
bootstrapped to reflect the two stage estimation procedure.  The estimate is positive for 
the U.S. and negative for Germany.  The interpretation is that unobservables related to 
job match quality would lead to an overstatement of skill related wage growth in the 
United States and an understatement in Germany using least squares.  Stated differently, 
average job match quality has led to an increased rate of wage growth in the U.S. but has 
reduced it in Germany.  
 The signs of these job match components are consistent with the estimates 
obtained using the fixed-effects estimator.  Prior research suggests that the negative sign 
from each of these estimators for Germany is plausible.  For example, Abowd, Karmarz, 
and Margolis (Table IV) also report impacts of firm matching on returns to tenure in 
France which range from 0 to -.036 depending on the estimator employed.  They also 
demonstrate that controlling for person fixed effects raises the estimated return to 
experience in France.  In general, this is the same pattern found here for Germany.6   
 The estimate of bias in total wage growth provided by (b1 + b2) can also be 
inserted into equation (4.) to gauge a portion of the bias that unobservables have on either 
the estimated return to experience or tenure.  This requires that an additional parameter, 
, be estimated from an auxiliary regression of tenure on initial experience.  That 
parameter for the U.S. is -.064 and -.160 for Germany.  Calculated as , the 
portion of the bias due to this component in each country is negligible, -.002 in the U.S. 
TX o
γ
)( 210 bbTX +γ
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and .004 in Germany.  Considering equation (4.), the implication is that in both countries 
the bias in estimating rates of return operates principally through the correlation of 
general skills with job matches. 
VI.  Conclusion 
 This paper provides an analysis of the contribution of job matching to wage 
growth in Germany and the United States.  The estimated rate of real wage growth in the 
U.S. is consistently found to be higher than in Germany.  This result is obtained both in 
panel regressions (table 1) and in a differenced estimator (table 2).   
 Real rates of wage growth, however, depend on many policies beyond those 
directly aimed at the labor market.  While job matches also depend on factors beyond a 
nation’s approach to workforce education and training, those policies are directly 
intended to provide better employment matches between workers and firms.  Moreover, 
accepted theory suggests that one component of wage growth is due to job matching.   
 In the analysis presented here, job matches are found to promote overall wage 
growth in the U.S.  In Germany, job matches are found to retard overall wage growth.  
This result is consistent across both a fixed effect estimator (table 1) and a two step 
procedure (tables 2 and 3) developed by Topel (1991).  Also, using the two-step 
estimator, evidence is found in both countries that the impact of job matching on wage 
growth operates primarily through the relationship of general skills to employment. 
 Education and training policies have many other aims beyond promoting wage 
growth or improvement of employment matches.  Also, empirical results such as these 
are appropriately seen as robust when replicated in other research.  Nonetheless, the 
results reported here for the effect of job matching on wage growth are potentially very 
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interesting because they suggest that some of the common complaints about relatively 
centralized and specific systems of education and training may be true. 
 Having youths choose occupations relatively early may result in poor individual 
choices that are difficult to correct.  Focusing on specific skills may reduce chances for 
mobility.  Planning may not be flexible enough in the face of structural changes in the 
economy.  The research contained in this paper does not address each of these individual 
topics but does suggest avenues for future research. 
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Table 1 
Unweighted Estimates of Returns to Skills in the United States and Germany 
1984-1992 
 
 Means and 
Standard Deviations 
Panel Regressions Fixed Effect Model 
 United 
States 
Germany United 
States 
Germany United 
States 
Germany 
Regressors:       
       
Experience 12.05 
(8.17) 
18.72 
(11.42) 
.063 
(.005)* 
.031 
(.002)* 
.044 
(.007)* 
.041 
(.003)* 
Experience2/(102) 2.12 
(2.66) 
4.81  
(4.63) 
-.561 
(.063)* 
-.218 
(.022)* 
-.383 
(.081)* 
-.199 
(.028)* 
Experience3/(103) 4.65 
(8.13) 
14.11 
(17.62) 
.214 
(.029)* 
.063 
(.008)* 
.132 
(.037)* 
.056 
(.010)* 
Experience4/(104) 11.58 
(25.08) 
44.59 
(67.25) 
-.028 
(.004)* 
-.006 
(.001)* 
-.016 
(.006)* 
-.006 
(.001)* 
       
Tenure 9.04 
(8.41) 
10.80 
(8.67) 
.044 
(.004)* 
.013 
(.002)* 
.018 
(.004)* 
.017 
(.002)* 
Tenure2/(102) 1.52 
(2.58) 
1.92  
(2.62) 
-.255 
(.049)* 
-.094 
(.023)* 
-.136 
(.049)* 
-.164 
(.026)* 
Tenure3/(103) 3.44 
(8.17) 
4.21  
(8.19) 
.068 
(.021)* 
.034 
(.010)* 
.044 
(.022)* 
.055 
(.012)* 
Tenure4/(104) 8.99 
(27.46) 
10.54 
(27.16) 
-.007 
(.003)* 
-.004 
(.001)* 
-.005 
(.003)* 
-.006 
(.002)* 
       
Years of School 13.23 
(2.35) 
11.45 
(2.58) 
.052 
(.001)* 
.019 
(.001)* 
.002 
(.009) 
.037 
(.005)* 
       
Marital Status .75  
(.44) 
.74  
(.44) 
.059 
(.006)* 
.031 
(.004)* 
.011 
(.008)* 
.014 
(.006)* 
       
Log Wages .93 (.28) 1.11 (.15) ----- ----- ----- ----- 
       
R-Squared ----- ----- .33 .27 .15 .16 
N 10,110 8,281 10,110 8,281 10,110 8,281 
Source:  The estimates presented in the table are weighted and based on calculations by the author using 
data drawn from the 1984 through 1992 years of the PSID and GSOEP.  A full description of the sample is 
contained in the text.  The estimates are weighted to reflect the longitudinal nature of the data.  Entries in 
the columns for mean and standard deviation take the form: mean (standard deviation).  Entries in the other 
columns take the form:  parameter (standard error).  See Appendix table 2 for unweighted estimates.  * 
denotes statistical significance at the .05 level. 
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Table 2 
 
Estimates of Equation (2.) 
Model of Annual Within-Job Wage Growth 
PSID and GSOEP Males 1984-1992 
Dependent Variable is Change in Log Real Wage 
  United States 
Variable  (1.) (2.) (3.) 
 Tenure  .117 (.016)* .118 (.016)* .126 (.018)* 
 Tenure2 /(102)   -.069 (.022)* -.306 (.148)* 
 Tenure3 /(103)    .068 (.064) 
 Tenure4 /(104)    -.004 (.008) 
 Experience2 /(102)  -.735 (.168)* -.673 (.169)* -.540 (.175)* 
 Experience3 /(103)  .193 (.065)* .187 (.065) .141 (.067)* 
 Experience4 /(104)  -.018 (.008)* -.018 (.008) -.013 (.008) 
     
R-Squared  .012 .014 .016 
  Germany 
 Tenure  .079 (.014)* .081 (.014)* .098 (.015)* 
 Tenure2 /(102)   -.034 (.022) -.523 (.129)* 
 Tenure3 /(103)    .228 (.057)* 
 Tenure4 /(104)    -.031 (.008)* 
 Experience2 /(102)  -.291 (.137)* -.279 (.137)* -.149 (.142) 
 Experience3 /(103)  .080 (.048) .081 (.048) .038 (.049) 
 Experience4 /(104)  -.008 (.005) -.009 (.005) -.004 (.006) 
     
R-Squared  .010 .010 .010 
 
Note: Table entries take the form: parameter (standard error).  The estimates are 
weighted. * denotes statistical significance at the .05 level. 
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Table 3 
 
Second Step Estimates  
Effects of Experience ( 1) and Tenure ( 2) on Log Real Wages 
and Least-Squares Bias in Wage Growth (b1 + b2) 
 
  Wage Growth 
 β1 +  β2 
Experience 
 β1 
Tenure 
 β2 
Growth Bias 
b1 + b2 
United States  .126 (.009)* .085 (.010)* .041 (.009)*  0.032 (.007)* 
Germany  .098 (.009)* .034 (.009)* .064 (.004)* -0.022 (.006)* 
      
 
Note: Table entries for model estimates take the form: parameter (standard error).  Other 
variables included in the model estimates are years of education and marital status. * 
denotes statistical significance at the .05 level. 
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Appendix A  
 
Employment Tenure in the U.S. and Germany 
 
 Direct data regarding years of employment tenure are relatively rare and form a 
key variable for the analysis presented in this paper.  Beyond a description of the 
recoding of the tenure information, this appendix contains a table of basic patterns of 
employment tenure across Germany and the U.S. and a comparison of the U.S. figures to 
published data. 
 The specific cleaning done to the tenure variable in both countries was to examine 
cases where across years of continuous employment, the tenure variable made 
discontinuous jumps.  The illogical jumps were recoded to be consistent with adjoining 
observations.  Also, where years of experience or tenure were simply infeasible given the 
age of the individual, they were dropped from the sample.   
  Appendix table 1 contains information regarding years of employment tenure for 
various age groupings in Germany and the United States.  The figures reported in the 
table are calculated using the samples from the PSID and GSOEP for male workers 
described in the body of the paper.   
 Among male workers ages 18 to 60, median employment tenure in Germany is 
seven years versus four for the United States.  Tenure is low in both countries in the early 
stages of labor market activity as would be expected.  By mid-life, German workers 
remain longer with their employers.  Among male workers ages 35-44, median tenure in 
Germany is ten years as opposed to seven in the U.S.  In later years of working activity in 
the United States, median tenure declines.  As a result, in the oldest age range examined, 
median tenure is 16 years in Germany versus 8 in the U.S.  The attachment of workers to 
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employers is more durable in Germany than in the United States, particularly as workers 
become older. 
 A brief examination of the tails of the distribution of years of tenure supports this 
conclusion.  Among all male workers in the United States, 70 percent have less than 10 
years of tenure and 19 percent have more than 15 years.  In Germany, 58 percent have 
less than 10 years of tenure while 27 percent have more than 15 years.  In Germany 
relative to the United States, fewer workers have short durations with their employer and 
more have longer durations.  This pattern is driven by older workers in Germany being 
characterized by having longer durations of employment than are observed in the United 
States. 
 It would be helpful to know if the numbers calculated here agree with other 
sources of information.  While a comparative source of data is not available for Germany, 
the numbers shown in table A1 for the United States accord well with official statistics.  
For example, the Statistical Abstract of the United States reports that in 1998, median 
years of tenure for workers ages 16 and over is 3.7 years and is 4.0 years for workers ages 
20 and over.  Here, years of tenure for a sample ages 18 to 60 are calculated to be 4.0 
years.  Perhaps of greater concern for the United States data is the rising pattern for years 
of tenure that declines at later ages.  In the Statistical Abstract, the same pattern is 
observed. Although the numbers calculated here are from panel data and the official 
statistics are based on cross-sectional data with a larger sample, the figures are 
nonetheless close in their levels and exhibit similar patterns in the movement of years of 
tenure with age.  
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Appendix Table 1 
Distribution of Male Population by Age and Tenure 
1984-1992 
 
  United States Germany 
Age  Median 
Tenure 
Less Than 
10 Years 
More Than 
15 Years 
Median 
Tenure 
Less Than 
10 Years 
More Than 
15 Years 
        
18-19  1.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
20-24  2.0 100.0 0.0 1.0 100.0 0.0 
25-34  3.0 86.0 3.0 4.0 84.0 3.0 
35-44  7.0 59.0 25.0 10.0 48.0 28.0 
45-49  11.0 48.0 41.0 14.0 33.0 48.0 
50-60  8.0 53.0 39.0 16.0 34.0 53.0 
        
All Ages  4.0 70.0 19.0 7.0 58.0 27.0 
        
 
Source: The numbers reported in the table were calculated by the author using data from 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the United States and the German Socio-
Economic Panel for Germany.  Data from both surveys were drawn from the panel years 
from 1984 through 1992 and are weighted to account for their longitudinal nature.  Other 
than the median tenure figures reported, the other table entries are percentages. 
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Appendix Table 2 
Weighted Regressions of Male Wages for Germany and the United States 
1984-1992 
 
 Means and Standard Deviations Regressions 
 United States Germany United States Germany 
Regressors:     
     
Experience 11.44 (8.10) 19.21 (11.42) .069 (.005)* .029 (.002)* 
Experience2/(102) 1.96 (2.59) 4.99 (4.67) -.601 (.057)* -.205 (.022)* 
Experience3/(103) 4.26 (7.86) 14.73 (17.88) .220 (.026)* .059 (.008)* 
Experience4/(104) 10.57 (24.11) 46.74 (68.53) -.028 (.004)* -.006 (.001)* 
     
Tenure 8.59 (8.12) 11.04 (8.73) .038 (.004)* .013 (.002)* 
Tenure2/(102) 1.40 (2.44) 1.98 (2.66) -.216 (.044)* -.105 (.023)* 
Tenure3/(103) 3.08 (7.68) 4.38 (8.39) .058 (.018)* .039 (.010)* 
Tenure4/(104) 7.93 (25.72) 11.02 (27.9) -.006 (.003)* -.005 (.001)* 
     
Years of School 12.76 (2.44) 11.46 (2.52) .048 (.001)* .018 (.001)* 
     
Marital Status .71 (.45) .75 (.43) .046 (.006)* .030 (.004)* 
     
Log Wages .87 (.31) 1.10 (.154) --------------- --------------- 
     
R-Squared --------------- --------------- .34 .26 
N 10,110 8,281 10,110 8,281 
 
Source: The estimates presented in the table are based on calculations by the author using data drawn from 
the 1984 through 1992 years of the PSID and GSOEP.  A full description of the sample is contained in the 
text.  The estimates are weighted to reflect the longitudinal nature of the data.  Entries in the columns for 
mean and standard deviation take the form: mean(standard deviation).  Entries in the columns for the 
regressions take the form: parameter(standard error).  * denotes statistical significance at 
the .05 level.  
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Endnotes 
 
1 The data used in the analysis span the years 1984-1992.  In order to avoid problems associated with 
reunification, only the former West Germany is considered in the analysis. 
2 Earnings in this literature often refers to a periodic rate of pay.  For the remainder of the paper, the terms 
earnings and wages will be used interchangeably although the paper analytically considers wages. 
3 The literature on displacement in Germany is more recent and has yet to consider this topic (Burda and 
Mertens 2001; Couch 2001; and Pfann and Hamermesh 2001). 
4 All of the figures presented in table 1 are unweighted.  The estimator for the fixed effect model would not 
accept weights so a decision was made to have all calculations in the table remain unweighted to facilitate  
a comparison to the panel regression estimates.  Weighted values for the means and the panel regressions 
are found in appendix table 2.  By comparison, the reader can see that the weighting had relatively impact 
on the calculations. 
5The notation follows that of Topel.  More detail may be found in his paper. 
6 The only dissimilarity in the finding reported in table 3 relative to those of Topel (1991) and others who 
have used this estimation technique (Jacobsen and Levin, 2002) is the magnitude of the estimated job 
matching bias.   Discussions with Jacobsen and detailed examinations of the estimation programs have not 
uncovered a source of this difference.   
